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Navigating Civic Space (NCS) examines changing civic space in Pakistan, Mozambique and 
Nigeria under the impact of COVID-19. This project is part of a wider research programme 
called Action for Empowerment and Accountability (A4EA). NCS focuses on tracking and 
evidencing the kinds of changes taking place in the nature of civic space in these countries, the 
implications of those changes, and the ways in which organised citizens and civil society 
organisations are responding. The project combines ongoing media and social media tracking, 
cataloguing of events, country observatory panels, key informant interviews, global literature and 
evidence review. In Pakistan the project is led by Ayesha Khan at the Collective for Social 




Action for Empowerment and Accountability (A4EA) is a multi-country programme 
investigating how and when social and political action leads to empowerment and accountability 
in contexts characterised by fragility, conflict and violence. This programme is supported by the 
Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office of the UK government, but managed by an 
independent consortium led by the Institute of Development Studies in the UK. The views 













The Collective for Social Science Research was established in 2001 with a small core staff of 
researchers in the social sciences with extensive experience conducting multidisciplinary research 
both in Pakistan and internationally. Areas of research interest include social policy, economics, 
poverty, gender studies, health, labour, migration, and conflict. The Collective's research, 
advisory, and consultancy partnerships include local and international academic institutes, 
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This background paper is a review of changing civic spaces in Pakistan during the brief period 
from July 2018, when national elections brought a new government to power, until the first 
lockdowns due to the Covid-19 pandemic began in March 2020. It will provide the context for 
interpreting events since the start of the pandemic, to show how civic spaces were grappling with 
growing pressure from the state even before this new emergency began. The source material for 
this paper is a combination of academic articles, advocacy organization reports, and press 
articles.  
 
The discussion begins with an overview of the governance context during these twenty months 
under scrutiny, followed by a section on the civil society context which provides examples of 
areas of mobilization and change. We then turn to the state’s response, and measures that sought 
to regulate or curb these spaces. Next, we discuss other threats to civic space actors which curb 
their freedoms, and close with a brief summary of the roles and strategies employed to counter 
these curbs and regulations.  
 
 
The Governance Context  
 
Pakistan has had three extended periods of military rule, each of them came to an end after 
extensive civil society mobilisation. The first (1958-1970) experience culminated in the 
overthrow of Ayub Khan, after widespread trade union and student protests in 1969. He was 
replaced with another military leader who held elections and oversaw a civil war that led to the 
eastern half of the country’s independence and creation of Bangladesh in 1971. The second 
period of military rule (1977-1988) heralded a process of Islamisation under President General 
Zia ul-Haq; the state made effective use of religious political forces to achieve its goals. It 
silenced political parties began widespread press and academic censorship, and broke the student 
and trade unions movements during this period. Pakistan’s third military ruler (1999-2007), 
General Pervez Musharraf, carved a deliberately moderate ideological position and invited 
representatives of non-government organisations to join his government as technocrats. At the 
same time, he conceded power to anti-progressive forces and tolerated the rise of militancy in the 
north-west border with Afghanistan. Lawyers’ associations launched a widespread judicial 
movement against his imposition of emergency rule and interference in the Supreme Court, 
forcing his resignation in the face of growing unpopularity. 
 
After two civilian governments led by the mainstream political parties (2008-2013, 2013-2018) a 
new party came to power in 2018. The current government is headed by a former cricketer-
turned politician called Imran Khan, who founded the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI) on an anti-
corruption platform. Prior to the elections he became an iconic figure of protest politics, holding 
a mass camp-out for months at a time in front of Parliament in the capital city of Islamabad, 
determined to topple the sitting government of Nawaz Sharif for having squandered the wealth of 
the people for personal gain of politicians. His popular support base is primarily urban based, 
comprising educated youth, business groups, and middle-class voters disgruntled with the 
performance of the political class and the slow pace of development.
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The main power broker behind the scenes in Pakistan’s government is the military and its related 
intelligence agencies.1 The country has seen the rise to power and dismissal of several civilian 
governments despite the return to democracy. Commonly referred to by some commentators as 
the ‘miltablishment’,2 referring to the entrenched interests of a powerful bureaucracy together 
with the military, this arena of power needs to be courted in order for any elected dispensation to 
survive. As Freedom House reported, the freedom of major political parties ‘to operate is related 
to the strength of their relationships with unelected arms of the state, which have sought to side-
line figures not to their liking through a variety of legal and extra-legal means.”3  
 
The military’s role in Pakistan’s politics and governance is often justified as a security 
imperative. This is in part due to the fact that political unrest and simmering conflict persists in 
much of the country. In the province of Sindh, the military, and para-military forces, have been 
called in more than once to Karachi to impose law and order when violence consumed the urban 
metropolis over the last few decades.4 Rural Sindh is the mainstay of support for the Pakistan 
People’s Party, with a long history of opposition to military rule, as well as a number of smaller 
nationalist parties accused of being anti-state. After the 2018 national elections, it is the only 
province with PPP in power.  
 
The province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) is located at the heart of global geo-political conflict. 
After 9/11 and the US invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan’s Taliban movement was based in the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), a semi-autonomous region in the country’s north-
west which has since been integrated into KP. A series of army operations succeeded in quelling 
the Taliban insurgency on the country’s border with Afghanistan. Indeed, the suppression of 
militancy reduced terrorist attacks across the country from 3,682 in 2015 to 228 just four years 
later.5 Nonetheless, the military action to defeat the Taliban included the destruction of villages, 
markets, and the death or disappearance of many individuals not involved in the conflict, which 
became the trigger for a youth-led ethnic Pashtun social movement. 
 
In Balochistan, province, a nationalist insurgency and military action to control ‘terrorism’ has 
stymied ordinary life outside the main city of Quetta, making it unsafe for many NGOs to open 
programmes in the rural areas or even visit their offices if they have them. A citizen-led missing 
persons campaign persists for the return of political dissidents who have vanished over the years. 
Since 2010, Quetta itself has been the site of frequent terrorist attacks by Taliban insurgents and 
sectarian organizations targeting minority Hazara community members and lawyers. 
 
Even after this last round of elections in 2018, Pakistan is still best classified as a ‘hybrid’ 
regime.6 Opposition political and civil society circles informally dubbed Imran Khan the 
‘selected’ rather than ‘elected’ Prime Minister, in reference to the allegations that the 2018 
elections were rigged. A leading democracy watchdog organization, FAFEN, praised the 
electoral process, while the monitors from the European Union gave a diplomatic statement that 
no rigging had occurred on polling day. Human rights activists alleged instead the military 
interfered with the pre- and post-polling process, pointing out the 2018 elections were the first 
time in Pakistan’s history that the army was deployed within the premises of polling stations.7  
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In the post-election, lull observers, analysts and activists waited to see how the new government 
would proceed regarding policies that affected civic freedoms. The country’s overall score on the 
World Democracy Index (Table 1) has declined, despite this second smooth transition between 
elected governments and an increase in political participation. There was no improvement in the 
broader political culture and civil liberties to accompany the improved scores for electoral 
process and political participation.  
 















2018 112 4.17 6.08 5.36 2.22 2.5 4.71 
2013 107 4.64 6 5.36 2.78 3.75 5.29 
2008 108 4.46 6.08 5.71 1.11 4.38 5 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (2018). 
The quality of political culture and debate declined under the new government’s anti-corruption 
agenda and discomfort with multi-party politics. It has filed numerous anti-corruption cases 
against opposition politicians, including former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and former 
President Asif Zardari, through a special body set up by the previous military government called 
the National Accountability Bureau (NAB). Bureaucrats, too, became concerned their decisions 
may lead to investigations by NAB in future, causing delays in the functioning of government. 
Parliamentary debate and law-making was stymied by the delay in notifying standing committees 
and the new government’s preference for legislating through ordinance rather than drafting new 
laws.  
 
Pakistan is a federation of four provinces, each with distinct ethnic, social and economic 
conditions. The provinces have historically resisted the tendencies at the centre to enhance the 
power of federal authorities at the expense of their financial and political autonomy. In 2010, the 
18th Amendment to the Constitution, passed unanimously, devolved significant power to the 
provinces in an effort to address these concerns, thereby neutralizing the power of ethno-
nationalist forces and strengthening allegiance to the federation. It removed the power of the 
President to dissolve the elected assemblies, thus reducing the chances of this office enjoying 
supra-democratic powers and being subject to manipulation by the military. Progressive political 
forces claim a major reason the military supported PTI to form a government was its cooperation 
to reverse this Amendment.8 A sensitive issue amicably resolved through the political process 





The Civil Society Context  
Some broad features of Pakistan’s civil society have been remarkably persistent over the last 
forty years, since the advent of donor funded non-government associations and the intermittent 
periods of civilian rule. First, it is vibrant, innovative, and in constant flux despite the reluctance 
of all governments, both military and civilian, to nurture civic spaces and concede the rights and 
freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution. Second, NGOs such as the Human Rights 
Commission of Pakistan and women’s advocacy organizations (e.g. Aurat Foundation and 
Shirkat Gah) have played a vital role in holding the state to account for its deficiencies in 
upholding citizens’ rights, democratic politics, and obligations for human development. These 
advocacy organizations provide technical support to the government to report against its 
international treaty commitments, such as CEDAW, and also write shadow reports of their own, 
which are often critical of the state.10 Government, in turn, favours partnership with those 
organizations that focus on service provision in the health and education sector, while reluctantly 
tolerating the calls from advocacy NGOs to improve its record on human rights, democracy, and 
civic freedoms in general. In times of crisis, such as the 2006 earthquake and 2010 floods, the 
government eagerly partnered with NGOs in its relief efforts, but later regretted the facility with 
which donor funds were allowed to flow into these organizations. Finally, the state’s discomfort 
with civil society spaces does not extend to activities related to religious organizations, funding 
of religious education and relief efforts, and associations or protests formed to counter the claims 
of progressive mobilizations.11  
 




Culture and Recreation 2453 5.5 
Education and Research 20,699 46.4 
Health 2700 6.1 
Social Services 3704 8.3 
Environment 103 0.2 
Development and Housing 3264 7.3 
Civil Rights and Advocacy 7815 17.5 
Religion 2184 4.9 
Total 44,625 100 
*As per the International Classification of Non-Profit Organizations. 
 
The last major survey of the non-profit sector in Pakistan, which for this purpose was defined as 
private, not profit distributing, self- governing and largely voluntary, estimated 45,000 active 
organizations (Table 2). Almost half of them were devoted to education and research activities, 
which, comprised mainly religious learning. (Madrassas, or religious seminaries, were excluded 
from the survey). A substantial proportion were engaged in rights-based advocacy work, many of 
which played a significant role creating a discourse for social transformation, in support of the 
vision provided by the women’s movement, labour movement, child rights’ advocates, the 
environment and sustainable development agenda, and human rights more generally. These 
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organizations, or NGOs depend largely on foreign donor funds to support their work, while the 
welfare-oriented NGOs doing charity work for the poor receive funds from philanthropic 
donations.13 
 
Formal NGOs, important as they are in Pakistan, do not constitute all of civil society space. It 
includes social movements and other instances of collective action, such as professional and 
workers’ associations mobilization. Thus, the selected examples of current mobilizations and 
activism discussed below reflect our understanding of civil society beyond formal community-
based or non-government organizations. 
 
Student Solidarity March 
Student unions on university campuses in Pakistan have been banned since the late 1980s. In 
early November of 2019, student organizations formed the Student Action Committee (SAC), led 
by the Progressive Students Collective.14 The SAC promised to address pressing issues such as 
sexual harassment on university campuses, cuts in the education budget, and interference of 
security forces in institutions.15 The Committee organized the Student Solidarity March, which 
took place in 50 cities across Pakistan on 29th November, 2019.16  
Police in Lahore arrested around 300 organizers and participants of the March on charges of 
sedition, including Ammar Ali Jan, Farooq Tariq, Iqbal Lala (father of Mashal Khan who was 
lynched over allegation of blasphemy in Mardan), and Alamgir Wazir (nephew of MNA and 
Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement leader Ali Wazir).17 In response to the protests, Balochistan 
University banned all political activities on campus.18  
The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) gave a statement deploring the 
government’s response to the peaceful protests and highlighted that propaganda against the 
marchers on social media could put their lives at risk.19 Prime Minister Imran Khan promised to 
remove the ban on student unions after establishing a code of conduct for how they would 
operate, but did not.20 Meanwhile, Sindh Police lodged a sedition case against Sindh University 
students for allegedly chanting anti-Pakistan slogans, wall-chalking and carrying Sindhi flags. 
The students rejected the allegations. Sindh University’s Vice Chancellor protested he was not 
consulted before the police case was registered.21  
 
Doctors’ Protests 
In 2019 a series of new laws were passed with the purpose of improving efficiencies in the 
public health sector through introducing privatization measures. Punjab, Pakistan’s largest 
province with a population of over 110 million, is often a bell-weather of social and political 
sentiments. When the 2019 Medical Teaching Institutes (MTI) Reforms Bill surfaced in Punjab, 
paramedical staff, nurses and young doctors formed The Grand Health Alliance (GHA) to 
mobilize against it.22 Members of the Pakistan Medical Association and the Young Doctors’ 
Association joined in. Healthcare workers argued the Act would make them contractual 
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employees, affecting their job security.23 After 10 days of protests, healthcare workers called off 
their strike when the government agreed to negotiate.  Demonstrations and strikes resumed a few 
months later, with protestors alleging the law was ‘anti-patient’, making affordable healthcare 
less accessible for the poor.24 Next, government banned all political activities and gatherings in 
hospitals and educational institutions,25 and a lawyer filed a writ petition in the Lahore High 
Court against the young doctors’ protests.26  
In March 2020, as healthcare workers turned their attention to the coronavirus pandemic, the 
Punjab Assembly passed the MTI law.27 A new round of demonstrations began, and there was a 
clash between police and protestors at a sit-in in Lahore in which some healthcare providers were 
injured.28 Advocate Siddique filed a plea in the Lahore High Court to initiate contempt 
proceedings against protestors citing that they were violating an interim order issued by the court 
to cease protests.29 
 
Lady Health Workers  
Lady Health Workers (LHW) are the front-line community health service providers in Pakistan, 
numbering over one hundred thousand today. In 2008 they formed an Association to stage 
protest actions and file legal petitions to demand a salary increase and full integration into the 
government’s service structure. They were broadly successful, but continue to mobilize to 
improve their employment conditions and benefits. In March 2019, LHWs held a sit-in outside 
the Punjab Assembly to demand the new government provide them with social security 
registration, pension, free healthcare, and other facilities.30 In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province 
LHWs blocked one of the main roads in front of the legislative assembly to make their demands 
heard.31 LHWs are not subject to the same harsh treatment that political activists experience, 
possibly because their demands are focussed on employment rights and their contribution to 
primary health care provision is vital to achieving the government’s targets.  
 
Women’s Day Marches 
A new phase of the women’s movement led by young feminists emerged in 2018, through a 
series of marches organized in urban centres to celebrate International Women’s Day. The 
‘Aurat’ (Women’s) March, brought together feminists, grass-roots workers, and members of a 
diverse range of community organisations in Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad. They demanded 
greater social and political justice and decried the patriarchal and cultural practices that limit 
sexual rights and freedoms in contemporary life. These Marches generated a great deal of social 
media backlash, mainstream press coverage, and broader social debate. In 2019, more cities 
joined in the March, once again attracting thousands of women in a show of street power not 
seen since the 1980s when the women’s movement protested against the military regime’s 
discriminatory laws in the name of its Islamization programme. In 2020, just before the 
pandemic led to lockdowns, the March took place for the third time. 
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This time, conservative forces tried hard to prevent the March from taking place. Lawyer Azhar 
Siddiqui, representing a Judicial Activism Panel filed a petition in the Lahore High Court to stop 
the Aurat March and its promotion on social media. He argued it was against Islamic values and 
funded by anti-state groups. The judge allowed the March to proceed with the caveat that it 
should refrain from any ‘immorality’.32 Similar petitions in Islamabad and Sukkur were also filed 
to stop the March in those cities, without success, while religious groups threatened to prevent 
the protestors from gathering. 33 
Political parties weighed in on the growing controversy, broadly supporting the rights of 
Marchers to proceed.34 In response to threats of violence, Amnesty International issued a 
statement supporting both the March and its popular slogan, ‘mera jism meri marzi’ (my body, 
my choice), which had attracted the most criticism from right-wing groups and politicians.35  
The government position was less supportive. The Special Assistant to the Prime Minister on 
Information, said at an event that some slogans used at the Aurat March violate Islamic values.36 
The Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) issued an advisory to television 
channels on airing ‘controversial’ content in relation to the Aurat March, particularly ‘indecent’ 
banners and slogans. PEMRA claimed it had received complaints from citizens regarding 
indecent slogans and discussions regarding these slogans being aired on television channels.37 
During a speech Prime Minister Imran Khan blamed the lack of a standardized education system 
for cultural clashes in the country, citing the Aurat March as an example of a ‘different 
culture’.38  
Meanwhile, religious, right-wing parties and groups organized ‘Haya’ (a reference to women’s 
honour) Marches in a number of urban centres on International Women’s Day to express 
opposition to the Aurat March, and support for women’s roles and rights within Islam. In 
Islamabad, protestors included students of the militant Jamia Hafsa, members of political party 
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) and the religious organization Sunni Tehreek. Indicating its implicit 
support for their mobilization, the government did not require the Haya marchers to obtain a No 
Objection Certificate (NOC) for their events, while Aurat March organizers were obliged to do 
so. In some venues, where the two divergent Marches came into contact, some feminist 
protestors suffered physical assaults.39  
 
Regulation of Civil Society and Civic Space  
Civic spaces are ‘the physical, virtual, and legal place where people associate, express 
themselves, and assemble’.40 Yet to flourish, civil society actors need to be able to function 
without fear of sanction, threat or abuse.41 In Pakistan both the spaces, and the atmosphere in 
which they function, are subject to growing restrictions combined with hostility and threats if 
these restrictions are not complied with. Pakistan’s Constitution protects the individual’s right to 
be dealt with in accordance with the law, along with freedom of movement, of association and 
assembly. Activists invoke these fundamental rights as they try to negotiate wider civic spaces. 
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There are a number of regulations and laws in place to govern the registration and operation of 
non-government organizations.42 During periods when the state is displeased with the vocal tone 
of advocacy NGOs, it has imposed additional restrictions or threatens to withdraw registration 
from these organizations. These NGOs are often accused of serving western interests because 
they receive international donor funds and argue for the implementation of human rights and 
compliance with international treaties. Governments regularly accuse women’s NGOs of 
representing un-Islamic, decadent and western values, threatening to shut them down.43  
 
The government increased its scrutiny of NGOs in the aftermath of 9/11 in response to concerns 
raised internationally about the need to curb terrorist financing and an incident with a US NGO 
linked to espionage leading to the assassination of Osama bin Laden in 2011.44 In 2013 new 
regulations required extra oversight of organizations which receive foreign funding.45 These have 
affected those working in the development sector more than organizations involved in receiving 
illegal foreign funds for religious extremism. The Pakistan Centre for Philanthropy, which serves 
as a governance advisory body for NGOs and helps them to qualify for government registration, 
acknowledged that the public image of non-profit organizations has deteriorated after the bin 
Laden incident, and that the multiple new legal requirements are proving onerous to comply with 
for many organizations.46 
 
Recent developments increased pressure on foreign-funded NGOs and international NGOs with 
offices in Pakistan. In 2015 all international NGOs were told to register with the Ministry of 
Interior and reveal their sources of funding. Some, such as the Open Society Foundations in 
Pakistan turned to court action to appeal against this step.47 While some of the petitions have 
been accepted and the INGOs are allowed to operate, others remain pending. This adversely 
affected funding to Pakistani NGOs which rely on the flexibility of support from INGOs which 
are focussed on supporting civil society activities.  
 
Pakistani NGOs are allowed to operate only after going through an increasingly onerous process 
to obtain a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and No-Objection Certificate from the 
Economic Affairs Division (EAD) of government. It is mandatory for all organizations to be 
registered with EAD before implementing any project, and the MoU gives these organizations 
the right to receive foreign funding and open bank accounts.48 The Pakistan Human Rights 
Defenders Network (PHRDN) condemned the federal government’s rejection of applications 
claiming that most of the NGOs were ‘wrongly rejected’ as they were working for the welfare 
and rights of the people.49 Many leading advocacy NGOs, such as Shirkat Gah, are struggling to 
obtain EAD approval at present despite working in the field for over thirty years, thus holding up 
the implementation of programmes which have received funding approval from international 
donor agencies. 
 
The government has set up Charity Commissions for the first time, to further regulate NGOs 
under a new national plan, adding another regulatory layer to the official requirements. Its 
spokesman explained the rationale as adding efficiency and facilitating the checking procedure 
from the interior ministry which permits NGOs to access foreign funds, thus avoiding delays in 
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their projects. He acknowledged a ‘trust deficit between the state and civil society’ which the 
new regulation was intended to redress.50   
 
In July 2018 the provincial Punjab government made it mandatory for all NGOs in the province 
to register with its Charity Commission’s online portal. Soon after, the government ordered 18 
international NGOs to shut down operations and leave the country. Many of them worked on 
human rights issues, but some of them were blamed for pursuing an ‘anti-state’ agenda. Their 
written appeal to the government of Pakistan was rejected.51 According to authorities, the 
systematic crackdown on international organizations was due to discrepancies in visa and 
registration documentation. The Human Rights Minister tweeted that these organizations were 
asked to leave because they spread disinformation and do not work according to their mandate. 
The Pakistan Humanitarian Foundation, which represented 15 of these 18 organizations reported 
that those charities alone helped 11 million poor Pakistanis and contributed more than $130 
million in aid.52  
 
Human rights activists and other civil society members urged the government to change course, 
arguing the arbitrary laws curb constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression, assembly and 
association. As Karamat Ali, Executive Director of Pakistan Institute of Labour Education and 
Research (PILER) said, ‘Pakistan’s civil society in recent years has come under increasing 
pressure for its work on fundamental freedoms. Not only have the members of civil society faced 
curbs on their operations, there have also been threats to the lives, security and well-being of 
those involved in any activity related to the advancement of democratic cause and fundamental 
freedoms.’53  Civicus reported that critical journalists and activists from civil society continue to 
face arrests and warnings from Twitter that they had violated Pakistani laws.54 
 
The government’s efforts to develop legislative oversight of digital spaces began well before the 
2018 elections. The Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA) was drafted in haste and 
passed without taking the opposition into confidence in April 2016.55 When it went to the upper 
house for approval, several senators termed it a ‘dangerous’ and ‘black law’56 which gave the 
interior ministry ‘blanket order’ to act against those posting online against the army or Pakistan’s 
national interests. The law has been used to arrest or investigate journalists for their posts on 
social media57 although 41 banned terrorist and anti-state organizations have been operating 
freely on such platforms.58 The government failure to protect a woman from cyber-harassment 
has been blamed for her suicide.59 It has now added an amendment to PECA through which 
blasphemy and pornography would also fall under its ambit.60  
 
One of the leading civil society voices in preserving freedoms in cyber space is the Digital 
Rights Foundation advocacy organization, which argues that government has used the law to 
silence dissent instead of protecting its citizens.61 It says the Federal Investigation Agency has 
been inconsistent in its application of the law, registering police cases against journalists yet 
refusing to do the same against religious leaders or individuals favoured by government.62  
Further evidence for this argument came in January 2019, when the authorities pressurized 
Google to censor a faculty petition on academic freedom signed by concerned faculty members 
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across several universities in Pakistan. The government cited PECA’s provision on ‘hate speech’ 
and section 37 on ‘unlawful online content’ as the legal basis to remove the open letter on 
Google Drive. 
 
In January 2020, the federal cabinet approved a new set of regulations called the Citizens 
Protection (Against Online Harm) Rules 2020.63 It requires social media companies, including 
Facebook, Twitter and YouTube to register with government and set up permanent offices in 
Islamabad. The companies must remove within 24 hours any content that the Pakistani 
government deems ‘unlawful.’64 They will be required to provide decrypted content and 
information on users accused of posting material which is blasphemous or related to terrorism, 
extremism, hate speech, defamation, fake news, incitement to violence and national security.65 A 
national coordinator will be appointed to enforce these rules. Activists dubbed these rules 
‘draconian’ and an attack on freedom of speech.66 
In February, the Islamabad High Court ordered the government and relevant law and information 
technology ministries to submit replies to a petition arguing these regulations violate Article 19 
and 19 (a) of the Constitution and termed it an attempt by the government to stifle dissent and 
free speech.67 The court refused to suspend the application of these new rules in the meantime. 
Several social media companies wrote a letter to the Prime Minister threatening to withdraw their 
services because these new regulations would make it difficult for them to operate.68 The 
government responded by forming a consultative committee with stakeholders to review the 
laws.69  
The tightening of regulatory mechanisms on national and international NGOs in Pakistan has 
curtailed the flow of aid funds to support their activities. Multi-lateral donors, such as the United 
Nations agencies, World Bank, Asian Development Bank and European Union, have a strong 
presence in Pakistan but work primarily directly with government on a wide range of social 
sector support programmes and post-conflict reconstruction initiatives. Bi-lateral aid agencies, 
led by USAID and UK Aid, have large programmes that include support to NGOs and 
community-based organizations. The modus operandi for disbursing these amounts, however, 
has changed since July 2018 because a number of national NGOs through which major 
programmes were implemented have lost their registration with government. For example, the 
UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) implemented its £39 million AAWAZ 
programme (2012-2018), to enable citizen action towards an inclusive and tolerant Pakistan, 
through partnering with a consortium of national development NGOs, two of which eventually 
had their No-Objection Certificates to work in certain districts cancelled.70 
 
Constraints to Civic Space   
The state constrains civic spaces in the name of maintaining security and safeguarding the 
national ideology of Pakistan, which involves preserving the Islamic character of state and 
society. Public discourse is indirectly controlled through pressure on journalists to adhere to the 
state narrative, limitations on academic and cultural discourse, and tacit permission for religious 
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extremist groups to threaten and intimidate dissident voices. The abduction and disappearance of 
political dissenters and public critics has led two helplines being established run by charity 
organizations for citizens to report missing persons. The HRCP reported 2,141 missing persons 
cases up until 2019.71  
 
As Pakistan’s ‘national ideology’ became increasingly Islamic during the 1980s, a number of 
laws to limit religious freedoms were passed to enforce a majoritarian Sunni Muslim state. The 
blasphemy laws, punishable by death, have been used to target non-Muslims, minority Muslims 
belonging to other sects,72 human rights activists, and political dissenters. In a recent example 
after the 2018 change in government, an angry mob of religious leaders attacked a Hindu temple 
in Sindh after a Muslim student accused a Hindu teacher of blasphemy. The source of the dispute 
turned out to be political rivalry, yet the tool of intimidation was easy to employ in a context 
where religious sentiments are easily manipulated. Although political parties and civil society 
organizations condemned the mob action and filed police cases, the accused have since been 
released.73 
Pre-election pressure on the media helped to cast doubts on the fairness of the electoral process.74 
In one instance, armed men entered the Karachi Press Club and harassed journalists, and forcibly 
took pictures and videos from their phone cameras. The day after the attack, 200 journalists held 
demonstrations in front of the Governor House to protest the violation of the sanctity of 
Karachi’s oldest press house.75 After the elections, the new government announced plans to 
merge separate regulatory bodies into one unified body to manage all electronic media, including 
social media. Several media associations including The All Pakistan Newspaper Society 
(APNS), Council of Pakistan Newspaper Editors (CPNE), Pakistan Federal Union of Journalists 
(PFUJ) and Press Council of Pakistan (PCP) strongly opposed the measures.76 In another move, a 
new watchdog Content Committee was formed to approve all advertisements for print and 
electronic media, comprising provincial information ministers from the ruling party.77 
The clampdown on social media increased post 2018 elections. According to ‘Facebook 
Transparency Report’ released in November 2018, Pakistan emerged as the number one country 
in the world with 2,203 requests from government to Facebook for content restriction. The 
‘Twitter Transparency Report’ ranked Pakistan third highest with 3,004 accounts inciting 
violence and spreading hate material. The Freedom House declared Pakistan ‘Not Free’ in terms 
of internet use for the seventh consecutive year in its global report released in December 2018.78 
The democracy monitor reported that Pakistani authorities blocked more than 800,000 websites 
and platforms from being accessed within the country, including political, religious, and social 
content from June 2018 to May 2019.79 
A leading national English-language newspaper, Dawn, has come under pressure for its criticism 
of the new government, leading to withdrawal of state advertising, nearly causing its financial 
collapse. Similar pressure has led to the collapse of many local language daily papers due to the 
same withdrawal of advertising revenue. Dawn’s foreign affairs and international security 
correspondent was stopped by two men in civilian clothes after he had met a British diplomat 
and was asked to accompany them for inspection.80  According to the Committee to Protect 
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Journalists, ‘the country’s powerful military quietly, but effectively, restricts reporting by barring 
access, encouraging self-censorship through direct and in-direct acts of intimidation.’81   
 
Civil Society Roles and Strategies 
This brief overview has shown that civil society and civic spaces in Pakistan were vibrant during 
the period immediately post-election in 2018 until the time the pandemic struck less than two 
years later. The range of strategies to articulate demands remained similar to ones that civil 
society actors and social mobilizations have employed for decades: court petitions, sit-ins, 
demonstrations, awareness-raising and advocacy with policy makers, and speaking out through 
different forms of media. The High Courts have been responsive to petitions from civil society 
against arbitrary regulations restricting their voice, however senior judges critical of the 
government have also found themselves subject to allegations of corruption. Feminists turned to 
the ruling Pakistan People’s Party in the province of Sindh, which is relatively more progressive 
than other mainstream parties on gender issues, for police protection during the Karachi Aurat 
March this year. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan used the protection afforded by its 
national and international platform to raise questions about the electoral process and curbs on 
civic spaces, and it continued to publish reports critical of the state’s measures. Other advocacy 
NGOs lobbied with politicians and bureaucrats behind the scenes to share their concerns about 
the new Charities Commission, but they made little headway. When security agencies target 
individual activists, behind the scenes negotiations with influential individuals have reduced the 
pressure in some cases. Politicians, meanwhile, struggled to contend the threat of NAB cases, 
and petitioned the Supreme Court to stop the government from using accountability for 
corruption as a means to silence dissent.  
Growing restrictions to curtail media freedoms and digital spaces have become a source of 
extensive debate. Some senior journalists, such as Talat Hussain and Nusrat Javed, left their 
positions as news anchors and columnists due to differences with management over new editorial 
restrictions.82 Social media provides a valuable alternative space for sharing political views, but 
it has increasingly become an arena for the harassment of dissent as well. Journalists use You 
Tube to share their analysis, independent from editorial oversight, and the platforms provided 
through online webinars have become increasingly popular for sharing discourse critical of the 
government. 
Civil society groups are monitoring the curbs on digital spaces in an effort to protect the rights of 
citizens. The Digital Rights Foundation (DRF), a feminist, not-for-profit organization set up a 
Cyber Harassment Helpline to provide digital security assistance, psychological aid and legal 
assistance to victims of cyber bullying and abuse. It established another project called ‘Ab aur 
Nahi’ in light of the #MeToo Movement to create spaces for individuals to report their stories of 
abuse, and designed an application called ‘Hamara Internet’ to provide free information to all 
Pakistanis regarding the reporting mechanisms in place in case of cyber harassment.83 Bolo Bhi, 
another CSO geared towards advocacy and policy research in the areas of digital rights and 
responsibility, tracks laws, files petitions and carries out campaigns to ensure freedom of 
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expression, privacy, digital safety and data protection for Pakistani citizens. DRF and Bolo Bhi 
collaborated to ensure digital accessibility during the 2018 elections.84 
Under the new PTI government and enhanced influence of the military in matters of governance 
and security, the tense relationship between the state and civil society took a turn for the worse. 
The mobilizations and activities discussed above are non-violent and framed in terms of citizen’s 
rights already guaranteed under the constitution of Pakistan. Some activists were charged with 
blasphemy and/or sedition for their involvement in student mobilizations discussed earlier Yet 
others were arrested on other charges or found themselves embroiled in court cases which 
prevent them from engaging in further activism. These measures have the effect of silencing 
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